4.19. Mnemonic imperialism: Russian memory policies

The article explores the enduring weight of the Cold War in the discourse of Russian political elites in the 21st century. It does so at two levels. First, it quantitatively traces the occurrence of words, phrases, and references pertaining to the Cold War in the public discourse of Russian presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Second, the article analyses, at a more qualitative level, the occurrence of Cold War references and phrases in the discourse of other Russian officials and ideological entrepreneurs supporting the authorities, including as part of the Izborsk and Valdai clubs. Based on that analysis, the article makes two inter-related arguments. Russian presidents have been reluctant to frequently talk of the Cold War or suggest that Russia was in a “new Cold War” with the United States. References to the Cold War in Russian presidential discourse have been subtle and related to elements legitimising Russia’s great power status, such as its nuclear power or UN Security Council seat, that are anchored in the Cold War period. At the same time, various experts and ideologues close to the regime have been prolix at engaging the idea of the “New Cold War” and openly discussing that either the Cold War with the West had never ended, or that it has always been ongoing in different forms since before Soviet times. The article argues that such a division of labour among Russian political elites has long allowed Russia’s leaders to speak to different constituencies at home – ones open to collaboration with the West and ones more strongly nationalistic. It suggests that, following the invasion of Ukraine, that division may have lost some of its relevance for Putin, leading to him more readily engaging the idea of the “new Cold War” with the West.

This paper examines the genocide discourse in Soviet and post Soviet Russia. The long duration analysis reveals a pattern in the Russian policymaking to interpret genocide instrumentally as a quintessential Nazi crime. Ever since the crime of genocide entered international legal discourse, the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation have been intent on linking it to the Second World War. During the debates on the draft genocide convention on the UN floor in 1947–1948, Soviet representatives took a high moral ground by declaring genocide as the ultimate crime of the Nazis. The Soviet dictator, Joseph Stalin, who reviewed and edited the draft Soviet proposal, removed all references to genocide as an international crime that could have a political form. Contrary to common belief, Stalin did not oppose references to political genocide to avoid responsibility for prosecuting political opponents in 1936–38. His true concern was the elimination of opposition during the Sovietization of Eastern Europe. After ratifying the Genocide Convention in 1954, Moscow utilized it as a rhetorical weapon against the West, particularly the United States, which only submitted the instrument of ratification in 1988. The glaring lack of impartial legal studies on genocide in the Soviet Union continued into post Soviet Russia. References to genocide resurfaced concurrently with Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, as an ex post facto justification for military intervention. The tired Soviet interpretation of genocide as primarily a Nazi crime has been reimagined in light of the full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Russian Federation has belatedly embraced a victim ethos. The new legal concept of “genocide of the Soviet people” conveniently blends the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II with the alleged offenses of Ukrainian "fascists" since 2014.

The presentation examines the mnemonic strategies of a specific stratum within Russian nationalism that emerged around the mid-2000s and eventually became predominant. This stratum is characterized by a relatively low level of ideologization and religiosity, an interest in seemingly apolitical social issues of local significance, and a willingness to cooperate with the state—contrasting with the anti-state stance of the previous nationalist generation. The author argues that while the "old" nationalists largely confined their mnemonic concerns to their political community, the new generation has gradually become a noticeable mnemonic actor in Russian society. First, the presentation identifies key historical periods, events, and figures commemorated by the new nationalists. Unlike the previous generation, which focused on the pre-Petrine era, the new nationalists pay greater attention to the late imperial period, World War I, and the anti-Bolshevik (White) side of the Civil War. Second, the author demonstrates how these new nationalists engage in memory activism, including the types of memorial events they organize or attend, including commemorations of recent events and contemporary political figures. Third, the presentation highlights the nationalists’ vision of the Great Patriotic War. Originally, this nationalist stream was strongly anti-Soviet, even denying the war’s patriotic nature. However, in their efforts to reach broader audiences and cooperate with the state, they have developed complex mnemonic strategies that allow them to remain in a "gray zone" regarding the commemoration of the war period. Research methods include deep interviews and participant observation, as well as critical analysis of the nationalist discourse.