8.19. State's official historical narrative and its disputes

This work analyzes the diverse memory policies that contributed to the creation of local meanings around State terrorism and its repressive actions. It reflects on the relationship between localized (peripheral) interpretive frameworks and those at the national (central) level, and discusses the role these local memory policies play, in terms of resistance, against the denialist discourse currently proliferating in Argentina.

This research explores how the five Central Asian republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, depict each other in state-approved history textbooks from their independence in 1991 to the present. The article focuses on a key question: Why do these countries continue to promote nationalist narratives in their history education despite growing efforts at regional cooperation, especially amid increasing decolonial discourse and geopolitical changes like the war in Ukraine? Additionally, what are the chances of developing a more regional approach to history writing? By analyzing over 150 textbooks published in the national languages of each country, along with about twenty semi-structured interviews with textbook authors, this study argues that the persistence of nationalist narratives is closely linked to the post-Soviet nation-building process. In this context, history education is used to strengthen national identity, bolster political legitimacy, and distinguish one nation from its neighbors. These narratives often ignore shared historical experiences and regional connections, even though political rhetoric promotes unity. Key findings include: (1) a consistent focus on national heroes, myths, and events that elevate each country over regional cooperation; (2) limited or superficial mentions of neighboring countries, often in conflict or strategic contexts; (3) a lack of coordinated educational reform and minimal cross-border historical dialogue among textbook committees; and (4) resistance to including regional or transnational perspectives, even when historical evidence supports such approaches. These findings highlight the structural and political obstacles to building a shared regional historical narrative and raise important questions about the role of history education in either reinforcing or bridging national divides in Central Asia.

In 2018, Armenia witnessed a change of government following widespread public protests, an event commonly referred to as the Velvet Revolution. Although the country’s formal legal and political structure remained intact, this moment was proclaimed as a phase of democratic transformation that prioritized new value systems and redefined public discourse. One of the key areas where this redefinition became visible was in the politics of memory. The post-revolutionary period, however, was soon overshadowed by the 2020 Azerbaijani military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to severe territorial and human losses. The Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia resulted in territorial concessions and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s subsequent large-scale attack, combined with the inaction of Russian forces, culminated in the complete depopulation of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. These traumatic developments followed by management of loss, official discourse toward deconstruction and reconstruction of historical events and national symbols have necessitated new articulations of memory politics in Armenia. This paper analyzes how the officially democratic government has sought to reshape the narrative of collective memory in the wake of war and displacement.t further examines the bottom-up production of public discourse surrounding these transformations, with a focus on the mechanisms of anxiety, silencing, and re-traumatization that emerge within the broader process of post-conflict collective identity formation.

From its establishment in 1948 until 1987, South Korea was ruled by authoritarian regimes that suppressed memories of the nation’s difficult pasts. With the transition to democracy in 1987 the process of transitional justice began, opening up new opportunities for social and political actors to discuss and commemorate painful memories. In contrast, Israel has been a democracy since its establishment in 1948. While there have been some efforts to target contesting memories, these initiatives have faced criticism and have not been successful in silencing opposing voices. However, with the formation of the thirty-seventh government in December 2022, a process of de-democratization was initiated, which would soon be accompanied by the government’s campaign to control the memory following the October 7 massacre by Hamas in 2023. What can the South Korean case teach us about the recent developments in Israel? By comparing the two cases through a focus on respective violent conflicts, this paper assesses the role memory plays in processes of democratization and de-democratization. In South Korea, I examine the struggle that occurred over the memory of “Cheju 4.3” (1947 1954) – a government led atrocity that resulted in tens of thousands of victims. In Israel, I explore the narrative surrounding the war with Hamas that the Israeli government is promoting. I examine how the war’s official collective memory is being produced and what reactions this elicits. The research is based on museum analysis, government reports, and press coverage, all of which are socio-politically contextualized. I demonstrate the extent to which non-democratic regimes invest in creating a preferred memory and the means they are prepared to take for this cause. However, I also argue that the South Korean case signals a ray of hope for Israeli social actors struggling against the government’s efforts.